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| Topic: | Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Example from Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Posted by: | joe becker |
| Date/Time: | 2011/10/16 14:00:49 |
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I take it that we see the tree before us as we hike through the woods and that this seeing has a role to play in our actions resulting in our not bumping into the tree.?I accept that there are cases --maybe the frog situation you refer to is one--where such internal sensory experience is not relevant to an animal's successful action on the environment.?My point is that there are cases where it is relevant.?Furthermore, I hold that (a) such sensory experience has the complexity involved in hearing both notes and melody--that is the complexity of having different degrees of holism.? (b)?that the mechanisms involved in this may be central in the development of our way of knowing the environemnt in terms of objects, in the further development of conceptual activity, and in the development of artistic activity. I have been emphasizing in my postings where I think constructivist theory misses the mark--its insufficent attention to internal experience, linked I think, to an overplayed separation of conceptual activity from sensory activity.?Yet, I also consider that constructivist theory has something very valuable to offer --the insight that the degrees of holism involved cannot be articualted in purely physical/physiological terms as has been proposed in neurological work on binding. |