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| Topic: | Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Example from Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Posted by: | Leslie Smith |
| Date/Time: | 2011/10/15 22:42:48 |
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Husserl is very good in his identification of the problem that norms pose for empirical psychology [see his Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: "crisis" in that, with Frege, H is co-parent responsible for the fallacy of psychologism]; but his answer was in terms of a special kind of [eidetic] intuition directed on essences required by universal and objective knowledge [the standard view of knowledge from Plato, Kant to Einstein] . A standard objection to H is how to demarcate this kind of intuition from other mental abilities, and especially whether there is any such ability at all. Peirce was very good in giving short shrift to any such position: "we have no intuitive faculty of distinguishing intuitive from mediate cognitions", adding that any such arbitrary hypothesis can be readily explained otherwise. On intuition, Wittgenstein went to the heart of the matter in his laconic remark "intuition: a useless shuffle" |