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[How do we know whether a mathematical proof is valid or not??Say that we consider it a matter of meeting certain mathematical/logical?criteria.?What is the basis of our acceptance of the criteria??I claim that our acceptance involves an experience we have of logical power.?I use the term "experience" in the phenomenological sense.?I hold that without an internal experience of logical power, our acceptance of criteria of mathematical/logical validity would be either totally outside our consciousness or conventional. ] My comments:?That is why analysis requires no detection of perturbations.?It is its own form of knowledge.? [Furthermore, I hold that our experience of logical power varies according to what frames we have constructed.?Using frames of level X one is not able to follow certain arguments even though one can understand each statement on its own--because to experience the logical relations among the statements, one needs frames of a higher level.?Here "experiencing the logical relations" is largely a reformulation of more standard expressions such as "understanding the logical relations" or "appreciating the logical relations."] My comments:?This is the nature of hierarchical complexity and therefore stage.?The whole point of the next order is it has to be defined in terms of the lower order actions, organize them in a non-arbitrary way.?That would include seeing the relationship between statements. [Moreover, I hold that people often attribute their confidence in some conceptual activity to its empirical success, and do not recognize the role of relevant internal experience of logical power.?For example, I claim that many people consider that they have confidence in the procedure of counting because they have lots of empirical evidence that it works fine.?In contrast, I claim that their confidence in counting crucially involves their internal experience of its logical validity. ] My comments:?People do not distinguish the standard three forms of knowledge even though they are basic in modern philosophy.?1.?Analytic, 2. Phenomenological, 3. Empirical. [Also, I hold that in the phenomenological sense, we experience the environment in terms of objects, and not just individual sensations.?We do not simply in some more abstract way "know" that the are objects out there.? This is similar to hearing a melody and not just the individual notes--we experience the melody, not just more abstractly know that it is there.? Similar to both is our experience of the logical power of an argument and not just the individual statements. ]? My comments:?You are make a gestalt argument for perception.?There are no anatomist anymore.?Almost everyone would agree that organization is crucial.?Pigeons can tell fish from non-first, trees from non-trees.?But this is done at stage 3, sensory-motor.