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Les?wrote on 10/12/2011: " In particular, even if all knowledge has its [a] origin in experience, the open question is how to [b] constitute it, how to ensure that what has been accessed or acquired is legitimate. Without [b], pseudo-rationality, pseudo-concepts may always be what was accessed under [a]. This is where [i] fails: it reduces [b] to [a]. For more on this distinction between [a] and [b], see my 2009 paper."?[By (i) Les refers to my emphasis on internal experience--as per my example of ( "do you think the dog actually smells something".} My response: I am not arguing that internal experience of the logical power of an argument is sufficient and that there is no important role for "ensuring that what has been accessed or acquired is legitimate."? I am arguing that, while constructivist theory offers much and puts us on a good road in many respects, a perspective that focuses on (b) to the exclusion of the internal experience will not prove adequate, and that much of constructivist literature/discourse falls into this category.?There is a resistance to the issue of the phenomenology and a disregard of its importance.?As I see it, this works against an appreciation of the deep connection between internal sensory experience and internal conceptual experience such as the experience of the logical power of a deductive argument; it works against progress in characterizing the relations between logical necessity and consciousness.?As I see it, this connection is a key to more adequate understanding of the evolution of?normative thinking and its development in the individual. Again, I would ask do we want to igive up the idea that internal experience of logical power is a crucial part of the basis for accepting criteria for ensuring legitimacy.?For sure, accepting a role for such internal experience puts us in the position of having to accept that at any time our ideas of what constitute correct criteria may be inadequate.?Well--isn't that so???On the other hand, giving a role to internal experience in regard to accepting criteria for legitimacy, provides a basis for seeing the criteria as transcending some mixture of biology (taken as it exists today, a purely physical science with no account for internal experience) and convention.? As to the difficulty of defining frame, another point of Les, I concur that this is a difficulty.?As I see it, the difficulty resides in our need for a "concept" that takes us into territory that transcends our understanding of physical science and yet remains naturalistic.?It is the basic problem of defining anything that resides somehow in a mental realm.?Moreover, this difficulty attends any attempts we make to explore the question of how the internal experience of logical power is open to influence by the cultural environment, as I suggested in my previous email.?Yes, in pursuing issues of consciousness we meet great difficulties, but I do not think that undermines the points I offer for consideration.