|
|
| Topic: | Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Example from Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Posted by: | joe becker |
| Date/Time: | 2011/10/16 14:06:13 |
|
For me the point is not internal events but internal experience. Our differences is in whether we consider that there are internal events of a phenomenological character--like seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling pain etc. and in whether this phenomenological character is involved in subsequent activity.?I do not contend there are no cases without this.?I note again that I contend there are cases with this, and refer to previous posts as to why I emphasize this. Question:?Is salience something that an organism internally experiences as per above??Or is it accountable adequately as some kind of neural event for you -- as you hold for the plan itself??Since you say it is a weak form of consicousness, maybe you are taking it as the kind of internal experience that I am emphasizing.?Then I would ask whether you see the experiencing of the salience--as opposed to the salience itself as a neural event -- as involved in subsequent behavior. If you take a neural event as identical to what I call internal experience, then I think you enter into the ground of identity theory of consciousness, and that would mark a basic difference between us. |